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Vaccination and non-pharmaceutical interventions for 
COVID-19: a mathematical modelling study
Sam Moore, Edward M Hill, Michael J Tildesley, Louise Dyson, Matt J Keeling
Summary
Background The dynamics of vaccination against SARS-CoV-2 are complicated by age-dependent factors, changing 
levels of infection, and the relaxation of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) as the perceived risk declines, 
necessitating the use of mathematical models. Our aims were to use epidemiological data from the UK together with 
estimates of vaccine efficacy to predict the possible long-term dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 under the planned vaccine 
rollout.
Methods In this study, we used a mathematical model structured by age and UK region, fitted to a range of 
epidemiological data in the UK, which incorporated the planned rollout of a two-dose vaccination programme (doses 
12 weeks apart, protection onset 14 days after vaccination). We assumed default vaccine uptake of 95% in those aged 
80 years and older, 85% in those aged 50–79 years, and 75% in those aged 18–49 years, and then varied uptake 
optimistically and pessimistically. Vaccine efficacy against symptomatic disease was assumed to be 88% on the basis 
of Pfizer-BioNTech and Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccines being administered in the UK, and protection against infection 
was varied from 0% to 85%. We considered the combined interaction of the UK vaccination programme with multiple 
potential future relaxations (or removals) of NPIs, to predict the reproduction number (R) and pattern of daily deaths 
and hospital admissions due to COVID-19 from January, 2021, to January, 2024.
Findings We estimate that vaccination alone is insufficient to contain the outbreak. In the absence of NPIs, even with 
our most optimistic assumption that the vaccine will prevent 85% of infections, we estimate R to be 1·58 (95% credible 
intervals [CI] 1·36–1·84) once all eligible adults have been offered both doses of the vaccine. Under the default uptake 
scenario, removal of all NPIs once the vaccination programme is complete is predicted to lead to 21 400 deaths 
(95% CI 1400–55 100) due to COVID-19 for a vaccine that prevents 85% of infections, although this number increases 
to 96 700 deaths (51 800–173 200) if the vaccine only prevents 60% of infections. Although vaccination substantially 
reduces total deaths, it only provides partial protection for the individual; we estimate that, for the default uptake 
scenario and 60% protection against infection, 48·3% (95% CI 48·1–48·5) and 16·0% (15·7–16·3) of deaths will be in 
individuals who have received one or two doses of the vaccine, respectively.
Interpretation For all vaccination scenarios we investigated, our predictions highlight the risks associated with early 
or rapid relaxation of NPIs. Although novel vaccines against SARS-CoV-2 offer a potential exit strategy for the 
pandemic, success is highly contingent on the precise vaccine properties and population uptake, both of which need 
to be carefully monitored.
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Introduction
The outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 identified in Wuhan, 
China, in December, 2019, shaped life in 2020 as a 
worldwide pandemic emerged.1 In the UK, the first cases 
were identified on Jan 31, 2020,2 with a rapid exponential 
rise in cases in February and March.3 The first lockdown 
began on March 23, 2020, and reversed the growth in 
infection, although important health metrics such as 
hospital occupancy and deaths continued to increase for 
many days.4 The steady, but spatially heterogeneous, 
decline in cases continued until August, 2020, when a 
relaxation of infection control measures and resultant 
increased mixing precipitated a second wave and, sub-
sequently, a second lockdown in November, 2020. By 
early December 2020, there were more than 60 000 deaths 
and 225 000 hospital admissions due to COVID-19 in 
the UK, and yet it is estimated that less than 20% of the 
population had been exposed to the virus,5 suggesting 
that the outbreak was far from over. Mass vaccination 
began in the UK on Dec 8, 2020, and offers a potential 
exit strategy while preventing excessive demands on the 
health-care system.
In early 2020, more than 50 companies began develop-
ment of the first vaccines against SARS-CoV-2. Of 
these, the Pfizer-BioNTech BNT162b26 vaccine was first 
approved for use in the UK on Dec 2, 2020, followed 
by the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine7 on Dec 20, 2020, 
and the Moderna vaccine8 on Jan 8, 2021, although only the 
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Pfizer-BioNTech and Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccines were 
in widespread use in the UK by February, 2021. As of 
February, 2021, the UK had ordered 457 million 
doses of vaccines from eight different developers:8,9 
100 million doses from Oxford-AstraZeneca, 40 million 
doses from Pfizer-BioNTech, 17 million doses from 
Moderna, 60 million doses from Novavax, 100 million 
doses from Valneva, 60 million doses from GSK-Sanofi 
Pasteur, 30 million doses from Janssen, and 50 million 
doses from CureVac. This amount is far more than 
any possible demand from the UK population, but 
mitigates for potential delays or failures from any single 
manufacturer. A continuing unknown with the potential 
vaccines is the degree to which they are effective against 
transmission, rather than simply preventing symptomatic 
infection (for further information see the appendix pp 1–2); 
this is a key uncertainty that we aimed to investigate in 
this study.
Vaccination against SARS-CoV-2 provides multiple 
unique challenges that are not encountered by many other 
vaccination programmes. Most of the experience about 
vaccination programmes is based on childhood vaccines, 
where the aim is simply to achieve high uptake in each 
birth cohort and associated boosters. To date, the seasonal 
influenza programme represented the largest annual 
delivery of vaccinations in the UK,10 but seasonal influenza 
immunisation is proactive (beginning before many cases 
arise), the influenza season is of relatively short duration, 
and the reproduction ratio for seasonal influenza is lower 
than for SARS-CoV-2.11 By contrast, for SARS-CoV-2, there 
is a race between infection and vaccination; infection can 
grow exponentially, whereas vaccination rates are inhe-
rently restricted by supply and logistics. However, the 
infection rate can be reduced by various non-pharma-
ceutical interventions (NPIs) while a vaccine is targeted to 
sections of the population where it will have the greatest 
impact.12 Therefore, the future of SARS-CoV-2 control is 
dependent, in complex non-linear ways, on the initial 
prevalence of infection, the strength of NPIs and the rate 
of growth or decay of infection, the speed with which the 
vaccine can be rolled out, the targeting and uptake of the 
vaccine, and vaccine characteristics. The uncertainties and 
interactions between these components necessitate the 
use of mathematical models to quantify and optimise 
the effects of vaccination on the COVID-19 pandemic.12–14
Here, we present an age-structured mathematical 
model, fitted to various UK epidemiological data, to 
forecast the dynamics of COVID-19 in 2021 and beyond 
based on multiple scenarios of NPI relaxation and 
vaccine characteristics. These model results provide 
possible bounds on the expected number of deaths and 
hospitalisations, thus providing important policy insights 
into the interaction between continued NPIs and the 
ongoing vaccination programme. We aimed to capture 
the risk-structured delivery programme for the UK and 
focus on the consequences of relaxing NPIs, and consider 
the individual risks and how these are mitigated by 
vaccination.
Methods
Epidemiological model and fitting
In this mathematical modelling study, we adapted an 
existing age-structured and regionally structured model 
of SARS-COV-2 dynamics that had been matched to 
UK data15 for the seven National Health Service regions 
of England and the three devolved nations (Scotland, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland). The model is extended to 
include the consequences of changes to NPIs, the spread 
of the B.1.1.7 variant, and vaccination (for the full 
description of the model and mathematical equations 
see appendix pp 15–22). The model is matched to the 
historical pattern of daily deaths, hospital admissions 
and occupancy, intensive care unit (ICU) occupancy, and 
the proportion of population-level PCR swab tests 
(known in the UK as pillar 2 tests) that are positive, and 
reliably captures the scale of the first and second waves of 
the pandemic; the same epidemiological quantities are 
forecast into the future. In matching to the available 
Research in context
Evidence before this study
We searched PubMed, Google Scholar, and medRxiv for articles 
published in English from inception to Feb 15, 2021, with the 
following search terms: “2019-nCoV”, “novel coronavirus”, 
“COVID-19”, “SARS-CoV-2” AND “vaccine*” AND “model*”. 
Previous modelling studies have focused on either control by 
non-pharmaceutical interventions or the optimal deployment 
of vaccination. However, to our knowledge, a combined 
analysis of a realistic vaccination programme together with 
associated relaxation of controls has not been done.
Added value of this study
We combine current knowledge and uncertainty of vaccine 
characteristics with a mathematical model fitted to 
epidemiological data from the UK to assess the implications 
of the planned rollout of a two-dose vaccination programme. 
We show that under plausible assumptions for efficacy and 
uptake, the UK is unlikely to reach the herd immunity threshold 
through vaccination. We predict that only gradual release of 
non-pharmaceutical interventions coupled with high uptake 
of a high-efficacy vaccine can prevent subsequent waves of 
infection.
Implications of all the available evidence
Our study shows that although vaccination of the most 
vulnerable groups will allow for some relaxation of 
non-pharmaceutical control measures, this must be 
done gradually to mitigate large-scale public health 
consequences.
See Online for appendix
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UK data, our prediction of daily deaths due to COVID-19 
corresponds to deaths within 28 days of a positive COVID 
test, which might therefore be an underestimate of the 
true value. Incorporating simple immunity due to 
vaccination into this model showed that prioritising the 
oldest age groups and most vulnerable people would lead 
to the greatest reduction in deaths.12 In this study, we 
increased the realism of the vaccination dynamics, 
including the anticipated speed of vaccine rollout across 
the population and the need to administer two doses.
We used a two-dose model to simulate the effect of 
vaccination in both reducing infection (and hence on-
ward transmission) and reducing symptomatic disease 
(detailed in appendix pp 1–3). We assumed that delivery 
of the second dose would be prioritised over new first 
doses, with an interval of 84 days (12 weeks) between 
doses, in line with UK policy.16 In the absence of detailed 
vaccine-specific information on how efficacy changes 
over time since vaccination, we assume a simple stepped 
efficacy that scales according to the assumed final 
vaccine efficacy, as follows: from the first dose to day 14, 
zero efficacy; from day 14 to second dose on day 84, 80% 
of final vaccine efficacy; from day 84 to day 98, 80% of 
final vaccine efficacy; and from day 98 onwards, final 
vaccine efficacy is achieved (appendix p 16).
We assumed that both previous infection and vacci-
nation grant long-lasting immunity to SARS-CoV-2 
variants circulating in the UK. Therefore, the model 
ignores the potential invasion or emergence of other 
variants where the vaccine might offer less protection, 
and ignores the effects of waning of immunity, which 
might become important over longer timescales.
Model scenarios
A key issue is that models cannot forecast the strength of 
NPIs that will be imposed in the future and the level of 
support (and therefore adherence to NPIs) from the 
general population. Therefore, we are forced to simulate 
a range of scenarios that might bound future behaviour. 
We optimistically assumed that in the short term (with 
precise dates depending on the scenario modelled) 
controls would be sufficient to keep infection levels 
declining; our fit to historical data estimated that 
during the lockdown from January to February, 2021, the 
reproduction number (R) has been approximately 0·77 
(95% credible intervals [CI] 0·75–0·80, but with 
considerable regional variation). Control measures are 
then relaxed in our model at various times (February, 2021, 
April, 2021, or January, 2022) and declined either imme-
diately or over a period of 5 months, 8 months, 10 months, 
or 14 months; under these changes we predict how daily 
deaths and hospital admissions are affected by NPIs and 
the vaccination programme.
Vaccination schedules for SARS-CoV-2 in the UK are 
not precisely determined over long timescales, although 
the immediate priority order has been defined.17 We 
implemented an accelerating delivery programme in 
our model that approximated the anticipated rollout of 
SARS-CoV-2 vaccination in the UK, and follows the priority 
ordering: 1 million doses of Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine across 
December, 2020; 1 million doses per week from the start of 
January, 2021, increasing to 2 million doses per week by 
February, 2021, using a mixture of Pfizer-BioNTech and 
Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccines, and 2·5 million doses per 
week from the start of February, 2021, until vaccine 
completion using a mixture of vaccines.
Throughout, we assumed a default scenario of 
95% uptake of first and second doses in care homes 
and those over 80 years of age, in line with current 
observations;18 uptake drops to 85% for those aged 
50–79 years, and decreases further to 75% for those 
aged 18–49 years. As per current UK vaccination 
plans, we did not consider the vaccination of those 
younger than 18 years. For the UK population of 
around 66 million people, around 3·3 million are older 
than 80 years, 21 million are between 50 and 79 years, 
and 27 million are younger than 50 years but older than 
18 years,19 and hence eligible for vaccination. In practice, 
vaccination is also likely to be highly correlated within 
households and socio demographic groups,20 which will 
weaken the population-scale effect of any protection 
against infection induced by the vaccine. We assumed 
that doses might be given to either susceptible or 
recovered individuals with equal probability, but such 
doses would only have an impact on the susceptible 
population.
Vaccine efficacy against disease was assumed to be 
high (in keeping with preliminary reports6,7)—94% during 
the earliest phase when just the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine 
is used, dropping to 88% as a weighted mean when the 
Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine is also used (appendix 
pp 2–3). The role of vaccines in preventing infection, and 
hence onward transmission, is less clear. Data from 
the Oxford-AstraZeneca trial have provided an initial 
understanding of vaccine capability to reduce infection 
(both symptomatic and asymptomatic), with a reported 
mean efficacy after one dose of 67% (95% CI 49–79).21 
At the time of writing data were not available for 
other COVID-19 vaccines. Therefore, we consider four 
different assumptions for protection against SARS-CoV-2 
infection: 0%, 35%, 60%, and 85%, which we assumed 
operates by preventing primary infection. Disease 
efficacy considers both pro tection against infection and 
the reduction of severe symptoms if infection does occur 
(appendix p 3).
Output analysis
We simulated infection dynamics from February, 2020, 
matched to the observed pattern of daily cases, hospi-
talisations, and deaths until the end of January, 2021, 
and output the daily hospital admissions and deaths due 
to COVID-19 in the UK until Jan 1, 2024, assuming 
the continuation of the vaccination programme until 
completion. The end date ensured that, under the 
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assumption of no waning immunity, the epidemic will 
have died out and no further deaths will occur.
Our calculation of R was computed from the predicted 
growth rate of infection, assuming the complete release 
of all NPIs and for a given number of doses 
administered. The calculation of R assumed protection 
against infection afforded by the vaccine but ignored 
any increase in immunity from infection after 
January, 2021. We con sidered hospital admissions and 
deaths from Jan 1, 2021, to Jan 1, 2024, and either 
showed the number of daily deaths and admissions or 
the summed total over this period. In a final piece of 
analysis, we calculated how the number of daily deaths 
was distributed between four groups: individuals that 
have yet to be offered the vaccine (predominately 
comprising younger age groups that were not eligible to 
receive the vaccine at that point in time), those who 
were eligible but because of health reasons or personal 
beliefs remained unvaccinated, those who had received 
one dose so far, and those that received both 
doses. This analysis was done with the assumption that 
vaccination offers 60% protection against infection, 
although the qualitative findings are insensitive to this 
assumption.
Figure 1: Scheduling and impact of vaccine uptake
(A) Assumed vaccine uptake over time, showing the number of vaccines given to each age group relative to the theoretical maximum when each person receives 
two doses. The non-linear spacing in the total number of doses occurred due to our assumption that an 84-day separation between first and second doses would 
be maintained throughout the entirety of the vaccination programme. (B) Estimated R for a given number of administered vaccine doses, ignoring any additional 
increase in immunity from natural infection (after Jan 29, 2021) and excluding any effect on contact patterns resulting from NPIs. Other values of R0 would introduce 
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Figure 2: Predicted daily 
deaths from COVID-19 in 
the UK after the start of an 
immunisation programme 
and relaxation or 
removal of NPIs
Shading indicates the level 
of NPIs implemented. 
(A, B) The effect of relaxing 
current NPI measures down to 
those implemented in early 
September, 2020. The dashed 
line indicates the point of 
partial NPI relaxation—
February, 2021, in panel A and 
April, 2021, in panel B. 
(C, D) The total effect 
(cumulative deaths) of 
different patterns of releasing 
NPIs. The central black bar 
represents the default uptake 
scenario, whereas the upper 
and lower edges of the box 
correspond to the pessimistic 
and optimistic uptake 
scenarios. Panel C 
follows the pattern in panels A 
and B, reducing NPIs to 
September, 2020, levels at a 
given date and calculating the 
number of deaths due to 
COVID-19 from Jan 1, 2021. 
Panel D keeps all NPIs in place 
until January, 2022, such that 
the vaccination programme is 
complete and then models the 
effect of complete removal of 
all controls. (E, F) Correspond 
to gradual reduction in NPIs 
from their maximum in 
January, 2021, until removal of 
all control measures. Results of 
all figure panels are the mean 
of 500 simulations that 
explore the inferred parameter 
values, and totals are 
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All results shown, including the estimated R, daily 
deaths, and daily hospital admissions, represent the 
mean of 500 simulations that explore the inferred 
posterior parameter space determined by matching to 
the historical pattern of deaths, hospital admissions 
and occupancy, ICU occupancy, and the proportion of 
pillar 2 tests that are positive; credible intervals for the 
predictions are shown in the appendix (pp 11–12).
Sensitivity analysis
Our primary sensitivity analyses are to the level of 
protection against SARS-CoV-2 infection (either 0%, 35%, 
60%, or 85%) and the scenarios for the relaxation of NPIs 
over time.
In addition to the default assumptions of vaccine 
uptake by different age groups (95%, 85%, and 75%), we 
also did sensitivity analysis using an optimistic scenario 
of increased uptake to 95%, 90%, and 85%, and a 
pessimistic scenario with decreased uptake to 90%, 
80%, and 70%, in the age groups 80 years and older, 
50–79 years, and 18–49 years, respectively.
Role of the funding source
The sponsor of the study had no role in study design, data 
collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of 
the report.
Results
Although efficacy against disease is of immediate benefit 
in protecting individuals against developing severe 
symptoms, it is the protection against infection from 
vaccination that leads to a reduction in the intrinsic 
growth rate and R. For the counterfactual scenario of 
zero protection against infection, we estimate R to be 
constant at 3·15 (95% CI 2·93–3·37) regardless of the 
numbers of vaccine doses administered, which is higher 
than in the first pandemic wave because of increased 
prevalence of the B.1.1.7 variant in the UK,22 but is reduced 
from its theoretical maximum (estimated to have a basic 
reproduction number of 4·31, 95% CI 3·91–4·80) due to 
natural infection generating an increase in population-
level immunity up to January, 2021 (figure 1). When 
protection against infection is high (85%), vaccination can 
generate a substantial decline in R, although insufficient 
to drive R below 1 for our default assumptions about 
vaccine uptake. Even when all second doses have been 
administered, we predict that R=1·58 (95% CI 1·36–1·83) 
for 85% protection against infection, with higher R values 
for less protective vaccines.
Upon relaxation of control measures we predict waves 
of infection and associated deaths, although these are 
reduced by increased levels of vaccine derived immunity 
in the population. Early, modest relaxation of NPIs 
0% infection prevention 35% infection prevention 60% infection prevention 85% infection prevention
February, 2021, partial release
Default uptake 166 100 (119 900–267 900) 152 000 (110 400–250 500) 140 700 (104 300–228 600) 130 100 (99 500–203 100)
Pessimistic uptake 180 500 (130 800–290 000) 164 400 (119 300–270 800) 151 200 (111 700–246 700) 138 500 (105 400–217 800)
Optimistic uptake 159 500 (115 200–257 200) 146 600 (106 700–241 000) 136 300 (101 400–220 500) 126 900 (97 400–197 100)
April, 2021, partial release
Default uptake 106 800 (75 100–178 400) 85 800 (62 200–145 700) 71 300 (56 100–111 300) 61 400 (53 100–79 900)
Pessimistic uptake 120 200 (82 800–203 800) 94 000 (65 900–165 600) 75 100 (57 400–123 200) 62 200 (53 500–82 400)
Optimistic uptake 99 800 (71 200–164 400) 81 700 (60 600–135 200) 69 600 (55 600–105 600) 61 300 (53 100–79 400)
June, 2021, partial release
Default uptake 98 100 (69 300–164 600) 73 100 (55 000–125 500) 58 900 (50 800–80 900) 53 900 (49 600–57 900)
Pessimistic uptake 111 300 (76 900–190 200) 81 000 (57 900–146 000) 61 700 (51 900–92 200) 54 200 (49 800–58 200)
Optimistic uptake 90 800 (65 000–150 200) 68 800 (53 500–113 800) 57 600 (50 300–74 900) 53 800 (49 600–57 900)
Data are means and 95% credible intervals. Three different timings of partial release are considered, bringing the level of non-pharmaceutical interventions to the levels 
observed in early September, 2020. Three different assumptions about vaccine uptake are considered: default 95%, 85%, and 75%; pessimistic 90%, 80%, and 70%; and 
optimistic 95%, 90%, and 85% in those aged 80 years and older, 50–79 years, and 18–49 years, respectively.
Table 1: Model projections of deaths due to COVID-19 in the UK between Jan 1,2021, and Jan 1, 2024.
0% infection prevention 35% infection prevention 60% infection prevention 85% infection prevention
Default uptake 129 300 (102 600–154 800) 133 200 (91 100–189 800) 96 700 (51 800–178 900) 21 400 (1480–57 600)
Pessimistic uptake 164 900 (134 500–190 600) 177 700 (129 100–235 700) 147 800 (89 000–235 000) 57 100 (23 000–111 500)
Optimistic uptake 108 700 (84 600–132 200) 105 800 (68 500–160 300) 63 251 (29 397–137 198) 1030 (300–17 500)
Means and 95% credible intervals are shown. Strict non-pharmaceutical interventions remain in place until Jan 1, 2022, and then are completely released, by which time all 
adults over 18 years of age have been offered the vaccine. Three different assumptions about vaccine uptake are considered: default 95%, 85%, and 75%; pessimistic 90%, 
80%, and 70%; and optimistic 95%, 90%, and 85% in those aged 80 years and older, 50–79 years, and 18–49, respectively.
Table 2: Model projections of deaths from COVID-19 in the UK between Jan 1, 2022, and Jan 1, 2024
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(February 2021; figure 2A), matched to the levels observed 
in early September, 2020 (when R was between 
1·2 and 1·6 across the seven English National Health 
Service regions and the three devolved nations without 
the B.1.1.7 variant in predominant circulation), generates 
a wave of infection and associated deaths even under our 
most optimistic assumptions (corresponding to a vaccine 
that blocks 85% of infection). Later relaxation of NPIs 
(April 2021; figure 2B), in conjunction with a vaccine that 
generates moderate levels of protection against infection, 
enhances the chance of accruing additional population 
immunity and generating a smaller subsequent wave.
To consider sensitivity to vaccine uptake, we analysed the 
total number of deaths due to COVID- 19 predicted by the 
model from Jan 1, 2021, to Jan 1, 2024 (figure 2C; ie, the 
areas under the curves in figure 2A, B). Even in these 
scenarios, when some degree of NPIs remained (at the 
level observed in early September, 2020), the abrupt change 
from a high to lower strength of control could precipitate 
an epidemic wave. The scale of this wave and the resulting 
total number of deaths is driven by the date of the 
relaxation, the level of protection against infection, and the 
uptake of vaccine in the population (table 1). Although 
early relaxation leads to the largest number of total deaths, 
for relaxation times beyond April, 2021, it is the level of 
protection against infection that has the greatest effect. 
The lower limit of these totals (around 50 000) is dominated 
by deaths in January and February, 2021.
If we wait until January, 2022, to completely lift all 
restrictions, such that the entire adult population have been 
offered two doses of vaccine, we still generally predict a 
substantial outbreak upon relaxation with a large number 
of associated deaths (appendix p 11 shows the associated 
dynamics over time; figure 2D, table 2). Even with 
85% protection against infection, the sudden release of all 
restrictions is predicted to generate an infection wave 
leading to 21 400 deaths (95% CI 1480–57 600). This finding 
is unsurprising given that vaccination alone is unable to 
drive R below 1 (figure 1B). The only exception is an 
optimistic vaccine uptake assumption together with a 
high (85%) degree of protection against infection, when 
subsequent COVID-19 deaths remain low but not zero, 
generating a mean of 1030 deaths (95% CI 300–17 500). 
When the vaccine offers no protection against in-
fection, removing NPIs triggers an uncontrolled wave of 
infection in which only those successfully immunised 
(around 88% efficacy in the 65% of the entire population 
that receive the vaccine) will be protected against 
severe disease, hence the predicted number of deaths is 
large (129 300, 95% CI 102 600–154 800). However, the 
relationship between these parameters and predicted 
deaths is highly non-linear and even when protection 
against infection is 60%, the predicted number of deaths 
from the post-relaxation wave of infection is 96 700 (95% CI 
51 800–178 900).
The modelled stepwise release of all NPIs generates an 
overshooting wave of infection (figure 2A, B); a more 
gradual release of restrictions could mitigate these 
effects (figure 2E, F). At 85% protection against infection, 
even partial release of NPIs in February, 2021 (figure 2A), 
generates an infection wave that peaks at 1670 (95% CI 
1000–3400) deaths per day, whereas complete relaxation 
over 5 months (figure 2E) or 10 months (figure 2F) 
leads to waves that peak at 430 (0–910) and 46 (5–180) 
respectively. Therefore, a slow release of NPIs might offer 
a realistic compromise, allowing a degree of relaxation but 
maintaining low case numbers if the vaccine confers a 
high level of protection against infection (figure 2F).
The precise dynamics and outcomes are contingent on 
the assumed intrinsic R before the relaxation of NPIs, 
which in this study is around 0·77 (95% CI 0·75–0·80) 
after a tight lockdown in early 2021. Other values for this 
quantity will change the precise curves but would not 
Figure 3: Characterisation of disease dynamics in terms of vaccine status as a function of the number of doses 
delivered so far
(A) Composition of the entire population. (B) Number of daily deaths due to COVID-19. (C) Proportion of 
COVID-19 deaths. For all panels, we display simulations assuming: 95%, 85% and 75% uptake for those ≥80 years, 
aged 50–79 years, and aged 18–49, respectively; 60% protection against infection; and with a moderate reduction 
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change the qualitative conclusions. We observed similar 
patterns if we examined the number of daily admissions 
to hospital (appendix pp 13–14), with a third wave predicted 
if NPIs are relaxed too early or if the vaccine has a 
restricted effect on infection and onward transmission.
Although we predominantly focused on the population-
level consequences of the vaccination programme, an 
important question is what is the proportion of vaccinated 
individuals who become severely ill and die with 
COVID-19 (figure 3). From 0–30 million doses and 
70–90 million doses, the number of individuals who have 
not been offered the vaccine declines linearly, reflecting 
our assumption of a constant supply of vaccine and 
progression through the vaccine priority groups,17 while 
those who are unvaccinated but in eligible age groups 
and those who have received one vaccine dose increase 
linearly. In the interim (between 30–55 million doses) 
and later periods (after 90 million doses) the priority 
switches to giving second doses (figure 3A).
Since the existing vaccination strategy targets the most 
vulnerable people first,17 early deaths are dominated by 
high-risk individuals who have been vaccinated and 
received just one dose (figure 3B)—in this group vaccine 
efficacy against disease is assumed to be 70% 
(appendix p 3). By the time 15 million doses have been 
administered, less than 15% of all deaths are in those 
who have not been offered the vaccine (figure 3B, C). 
Once 30 million doses have been administered, 
around 60% of all deaths are expected to be in those who 
have been vaccinated (figure 3C). Over the simulated 
epidemic between Jan 1, 2021, until Jan 1, 2024, we 
predict that 48·3% (95% CI 48·1–48·5) and 16·0% 
(15·7–16·3) of deaths will be in individuals who have had 
one or two doses of the vaccine, respectively. Although at 
the individual level we assumed that two doses of vaccine 
would reduce the risk of mortality by 88% (appendix p 3), 
given the high proportion of vulnerable individuals 
receiving the vaccine, deaths are inevitably dominated by 
vaccine failures (that did not generate immunity).
Discussion
In this study, we show that vaccines that provide both 
high efficacy against disease and a substantial amount of 
protection against infection offer a means of eventually 
relaxing controls without a large subsequent wave of 
hospital admissions and deaths. Our conclusions rely on 
the vaccine characteristics, but also on vaccine uptake in 
the population—in particular, the most vulnerable people 
who require protection against disease—but also in 
the general population, if protection against infection is 
to generate high levels of population immunity. In 
practice, vaccine uptake is likely to be regionally and socio-
demographically correlated.23,24 Such correlations could 
lead to pockets of high susceptibility in the population, 
which could act as locations of small-scale outbreaks and 
reduce the effect of population immunity.25 Vaccine uptake 
might vary over time as the perceived risk varies,26,27 with 
high levels of hospital admissions and deaths likely to 
generate a greater demand for the vaccine. We expect there 
to be a complex four-way interaction between levels of 
infection, NPI policy, NPI adherence, and vaccine uptake.28 
Therefore, from a public health perspective, it is crucial to 
understand the drivers of vaccine uptake and vaccine 
hesitancy29 to identify groups that might have lower than 
average uptake and plan accordingly.
Early relaxation of NPIs, before sufficient immunity 
has been established, would precipitate a large wave of 
infection, with resultant hospital admissions and deaths. A 
similar effect is predicted from any final release of NPIs if 
the herd immunity threshold has not been achieved. Even 
with high levels of vaccine uptake, a substantial fraction of 
the population needs to be immunised to prevent large 
subsequent waves of infection, implying that strong NPIs 
would still be required even when phase 1 of the vaccination 
programme (offering vaccine to all people older than 
50 years) is complete to avoid surges in infection. A more 
measured approach, in which NPIs are gradually released 
over a period of many months, has advantages over sudden 
changes to controls but still might not mitigate the worst 
effects. Calculating the effects on health services due to 
subsequent waves of infection is complex and dependent 
on both the volume and peak of hospital admissions. 
Similarly, although a rapid relaxation of NPIs might give 
rise to a similar expected number of deaths as a 
prolonged epidemic under a gradual release of NPIs, a 
more prolonged outbreak with a lower peak prevalence 
provides a far greater opportunity for future interventions 
to be effective and places less stress on the health-care 
system. Throughout this study, we focused on COVID-19 
related deaths, matching the common UK definition as 
death within 28 days of a positive COVID test. However, 
other measures, such as excess deaths, might give a more 
robust picture of the true effect of SARS-CoV-2, but these 
often have a substantial delay between deaths and 
reporting. We stress that if hospital occupancy and deaths 
increased to excessive levels because of changes in NPIs, 
we would expect both national legislation and emergent 
behaviour to limit spread.30 Therefore, our scenarios 
represent a pessimistic view of measures in response to a 
worsening outbreak.
Although we know that vaccines offer considerable 
protection against disease for the individual, at the 
population level we still expect a substantial proportion of 
deaths to be in people that have received one or two doses 
of the vaccine. The precise proportions are a function of 
vaccine uptake in those most at risk—increasing vaccine 
uptake reduces the number of deaths but increases the 
contribution of vaccinated individuals to the overall 
proportion of deaths. There is a strong influence of how 
well the vaccine protects against severe disease; greater 
efficacy against the most severe disease will again reduce 
the number of deaths and will also decrease the proportions 
associated with vaccinated individuals. At present, much of 
the available data for vaccine efficacy is generated from 
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younger age groups (below 65 years old), requiring 
assumptions to be made regarding the relative effectiveness 
in older people (over 80 years old who suffer the greatest 
burden of severe disease). Were the vaccine to be less 
efficacious in older people, this would result in a relatively 
higher number of deaths and an increase in the proportion 
of deaths associated with vaccinated individuals.
As of January, 2021, multiple vaccine manufacturers had 
published peer-reviewed articles to present the findings of 
their phase 3 trials.6,7,31 These publications have been used 
to provide approximate parameters for this model-based 
study, but many questions have not been quantitatively 
addressed. Therefore, several key vaccine parameters 
within the model are based on parsimonious assumptions, 
and we identify the following three limitations that require 
additional experimental or observational data to refine 
model assumptions. First, as explained throughout this 
paper, determining whether the vaccine prevents infection 
is key for the development of population immunity, and 
hence the role of vaccination in long-term control of 
COVID-19. In the case of the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine, 
initial estimates of efficacy against infection have been 
obtained from one group of a clinical trial in which 
participants provide weekly nose and throat swabs, with 
evidence of the effectiveness of the vaccine against 
preventing infection substantially greater than zero.21 
There is the potential for the vaccine to further reduce 
viral shedding from vaccinated individuals, reducing 
onward transmission, but this is likely to be difficult to 
measure in a real-world setting. Second, we assumed that 
efficacy against disease applies equally across the entire 
spectrum of disease, but if the vaccine offers greater 
protection against the most severe disease this will reduce 
our predictions for hospital admissions and deaths. 
Finally, we expect efficacy to vary with age and between 
risk groups and incorporating such heterogeneity into 
models is key for more robust predictions. With the 
number of clinical and observational trials in progress, 
these efficacy estimates are emerging from a rapidly 
changing field, with the estimated ranges of efficacy for 
each vaccine subject to revision as new data emerge. To 
that end, online living literature reviews have been 
produced to curate published data on safety, immuno-
genicity, and efficacy.32 Throughout this paper, we assumed 
a 14-day delay from vaccination to developing protection. 
Evidence suggests that some level of immunity might 
occur as early as 7 days after vaccination with the Pfizer 
vaccine,6 although the delay might be longer for the 
Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine or in older individuals. Our 
cautious assumption does not qualitatively change the 
infection dynamics, as it is equivalent to imposing a slight 
delay (7-day) in vaccine delivery.
Over longer timescales, the possibilities of waning 
immunity and virus mutation might influence these 
predictions. Waning immunity, either of naturally derived 
immunity or immunity induced from vaccination, might 
necessitate seasonal vaccination programmes against 
SARS-CoV-2, protecting the most vulnerable people in a 
similar manner to seasonal influenza vaccination.33 We are 
lacking in our fundamental understanding of SARS-CoV-2 
epidemiology, in particular whether subsequent infections 
have the same severity as primary infections, as well as 
quantitative estimates of the duration of protection. Both 
elements can be factored into the prediction mechanisms 
developed here, but without detailed evidence, such 
long-term forecasts are speculation. More data would also 
be required to include potential seasonal changes in trans-
mission rates, which might affect the shape of predicted 
epidemics but are unlikely to change broad patterns for the 
total number of deaths or individuals requiring hospital 
treatment. Furthermore, careful monitoring of viral muta-
tions will be needed to detect whether specific variants are 
associated with antigenic escape from vaccine-acquired 
immunity (as of February, 2021, the mutation with the 
strongest evidence of causing antigenic change was E484K, 
with variants containing the E484K mutation being of 
particular concern, such as the B.1.351 lineage34). In a 
population with high vaccine-derived immunity, vaccine-
escape variants are likely to outcompete the original 
variants, becoming widespread and necessitating updated 
vaccines to improve protection.
Effective vaccines with high uptake are likely to be an 
essential element in the long-term control and potential 
elimination of COVID-19. However, experience with 
other diseases has shown that elimination is difficult and 
generally requires a targeted multi-strategy approach.35 
The same is likely to be true for SARS-CoV-2, with 
eradication unlikely to be feasible in the short-term and 
requiring a global perspective. Although mass vaccination 
will inevitably reduce R and disease prevalence, other 
measures, such as intensive test, trace, and isolate 
strategies, will be needed to target pockets of infection. 
Maintaining low levels of infection is likely to be key to 
the success of test, trace, and, isolate strategies36 and in 
reducing the risk of vaccine escape.37 Ultimately, whether 
we achieve eradication of SARS-CoV-2 is likely to depend 
on the long-term natural history of the infection and the 
public health importance attached to this goal.
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